La tesi di Brentano e le sue influenze nel pensiero analitico

digital

Articolo

rivista	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
sezione	Online First
titolo	La tesi di Brentano e le sue influenze nel pensiero analitico Brentano’s Thesis and Its Influences in the Analytic Thought
Autore	Andrea Tortoreto
Editore	Vita e Pensiero
formato	Articolo \| Pdf
online da	01-2022
doi	10.26350/001050_000296
issn	0035-6247 (stampa) \| 1827-7926 (digitale)

€ 6,00

Ebook in formato Pdf leggibile su questi device:

Computer
con Software:
- Adobe PDF Reader
Android
iPhone/Ipad
con App:
- Adobe PDF Reader
E-Book Reader
Ibs Tolino
Kobo

Descrizione
The aim of this paper is to show the historical influence exercised by the so-called Brentano’s thesis. According to Brentano intentionality, i.e. the property of being about something or having content, is both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental: all and only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality. From this point of view, Brentano’s thesis responds to a cartesian, dualistic need, insofar as it tries to distinguish the mental from the physical. This idea, deepened by Husserl, is taken up by early analytic philosophy and becomes the ground of the intentionalist program, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features. The review ends with some notes on Sellarsian adverbialism, pointing the way for future theoretical investigations on the role that this position has in contemporary reflection. keywords Brentano, Intentionality, Philosophy of Perception, Bergmann, Sellars Biografia dell'autore Università degli Studi di Torino. Email: andrea.tortoreto@unito.it

Descrizione

The aim of this paper is to show the historical influence exercised by the so-called Brentano’s thesis. According to Brentano intentionality, i.e. the property of being about something or having content, is both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental: all and only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality. From this point of view, Brentano’s thesis responds to a cartesian, dualistic need, insofar as it tries to distinguish the mental from the physical. This idea, deepened by Husserl, is taken up by early analytic philosophy and becomes the ground of the intentionalist program, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features. The review ends with some notes on Sellarsian adverbialism, pointing the way for future theoretical investigations on the role that this position has in contemporary reflection.