Il problema della conoscenza a priori nei Philosophical Papers di Hilary Putnam

novitàdigital Il problema della conoscenza a priori
nei Philosophical Papers di Hilary Putnam

Articolo

Rivista

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA

Fascicolo

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2023 - 2. Matter and Its Semantic Correlations Some Ancient and Modern Examples

Titolo

Il problema della conoscenza a priori nei Philosophical Papers di Hilary Putnam

The Problem of A Priori Knowledge in Hilary Putnam’s Philosophical Papers

Autore

Antonio Lizzadri

Editore

Vita e Pensiero

Formato

Articolo |

Pdf

Online da

07-2023

Doi

10.26350/001050_000356

Issn

0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)

€ 6,00

Ebook in formato Pdf leggibile su questi device:

Computer
con Software:
- Adobe PDF Reader
Android
iPhone/Ipad
con App:
- Adobe PDF Reader
E-Book Reader
Ibs Tolino
Kobo

Descrizione

This paper presents an interpretation of the early thought of Putnam about a priori knowledge, after Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism. While Quine’s rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements and his epistemological holism involved the denial of a priori knowledge, this paper will show how, according to Putnam, they are coherent, underlining the epistemological value of pragmatic and extra-theoretical warrented assertibility criteria in the justification of empirical and formal scientific theories. Reminding C.I. Lewis «pragmatic conception of a priori», this paper will define Putnam’s theory as a «pragmatic-trascendental» theory of a priori knowledge, because it reveals within scientific practices «quasi-a priori principles», which are necessary conditions, in order to conceive reality and pragmatic experience. Moreover, this paper will suggest that Putnam’s claim about «quasi-empirical methods» seems to renew also the idea of synthetic a priori in a pragmatic way and so in connection with realism.