Continuità e generalità: l’anti-nominalismo pragmatico di Charles S. Peirce

novitàdigital Continuità e generalità: l’anti-nominalismo
pragmatico di Charles S. Peirce

Articolo

rivista	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
fascicolo	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2022 - 2
titolo	Continuità e generalità: l’anti-nominalismo pragmatico di Charles S. Peirce Continuity and Generality: The Pragmatist Anti-Nominalism of Charles S. Peirce
Autore	Claudio Davini
Editore	Vita e Pensiero
formato	Articolo \| Pdf
online da	07-2022
doi	10.26350/001050_000339
issn	0035-6247 (stampa) \| 1827-7926 (digitale)

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Descrizione
In this paper, I aim to show why Peirce refuses the nominalists’ commitment to the view that the cognitive content of a knowledge claim is exhausted by some set of claims about individuals and their particular traits. Firstly, I introduce the phenomenological premises of Peirce’s anti-nominalism. Secondly, I argue that Peirce frames his dispute with the nominalists over the analysis of the concept of continuity as a disagreement in set theory. Thirdly, I present an argument about the theoretical connection between generality, continuity, and the pragmatic maxim. Finally, I argue that the nominalist’s construal of general concepts fails to provide an adequate understanding of the concept of continuity; on Peirce’s view, every general concept defines a continuum and thus the failure of nominalism to explain continuity signals its failure as an account of general concepts. keywords Charles S. Peirce, Nominalism, Continuity, Pragmatic Maxim, Anti-Nominalism Biografia dell'autore Università degli Studi di Pisa e Firenze: Email: claudiodavini1995@gmail.com

Descrizione

In this paper, I aim to show why Peirce refuses the nominalists’ commitment to the view that the cognitive content of a knowledge claim is exhausted by some set of claims about individuals and their particular traits. Firstly, I introduce the phenomenological premises of Peirce’s anti-nominalism. Secondly, I argue that Peirce frames his dispute with the nominalists over the analysis of the concept of continuity as a disagreement in set theory. Thirdly, I present an argument about the theoretical connection between generality, continuity, and the pragmatic maxim. Finally, I argue that the nominalist’s construal of general concepts fails to provide an adequate understanding of the concept of continuity; on Peirce’s view, every general concept defines a continuum and thus the failure of nominalism to explain continuity signals its failure as an account of general concepts.