Continuità e generalità: l’anti-nominalismo pragmatico di Charles S. Peirce

digital

Articolo

Rivista

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA

Fascicolo

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2022 - 2

Titolo

Continuità e generalità: l’anti-nominalismo pragmatico di Charles S. Peirce

Continuity and Generality: The Pragmatist Anti-Nominalism of Charles S. Peirce

Autore

Claudio Davini

Editore

Vita e Pensiero

Formato

Articolo |

Pdf

Online da

07-2022

Doi

10.26350/001050_000339

Issn

0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)

€ 6,00

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Descrizione

In this paper, I aim to show why Peirce refuses the nominalists’ commitment to the view that the cognitive content of a knowledge claim is exhausted by some set of claims about individuals and their particular traits. Firstly, I introduce the phenomenological premises of Peirce’s anti-nominalism. Secondly, I argue that Peirce frames his dispute with the nominalists over the analysis of the concept of continuity as a disagreement in set theory. Thirdly, I present an argument about the theoretical connection between generality, continuity, and the pragmatic maxim. Finally, I argue that the nominalist’s construal of general concepts fails to provide an adequate understanding of the concept of continuity; on Peirce’s view, every general concept defines a continuum and thus the failure of nominalism to explain continuity signals its failure as an account of general concepts.