Continuità e generalità: l’anti-nominalismo pragmatico di Charles S. Peirce - Claudio Davini - Vita e Pensiero - Articolo Filosofia Neo-Scolastica Vita e Pensiero

Continuità e generalità: l’anti-nominalismo pragmatico di Charles S. Peirce

novitàdigital Continuità e generalità: l’anti-nominalismo
pragmatico di Charles S. Peirce
Articolo
rivista RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
fascicolo RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2022 - 2
titolo Continuità e generalità: l’anti-nominalismo pragmatico di Charles S. Peirce
Continuity and Generality: The Pragmatist Anti-Nominalism of Charles S. Peirce
Autore
Editore Vita e Pensiero
formato Articolo | Pdf
online da 07-2022
doi 10.26350/001050_000339
issn 0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)
€ 6,00

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In this paper, I aim to show why Peirce refuses the nominalists’ commitment to the view that the cognitive content of a knowledge claim is exhausted by some set of claims about  individuals and their particular traits. Firstly, I introduce the phenomenological premises of Peirce’s anti-nominalism. Secondly, I argue that Peirce frames his dispute with the  nominalists over the analysis of the concept of continuity as a disagreement in set theory. Thirdly, I present an argument about the theoretical connection between generality,  continuity, and the pragmatic maxim. Finally, I argue that the nominalist’s construal of general concepts fails to provide an adequate understanding of the concept of continuity; on  Peirce’s view, every general concept defines a continuum and thus the failure of nominalism to explain continuity signals its failure as an account of general concepts.

keywords

Charles S. Peirce, Nominalism, Continuity, Pragmatic Maxim, Anti-Nominalism

Biografia dell'autore

Università degli Studi di Pisa e Firenze: Email: claudiodavini1995@gmail.com