Sentiment, amour, vertu la morale kantienne dans l’éthique systématique de Hermann Cohen

digital

Articolo

Rivista	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
Sezione	Online First
Titolo	Sentiment, amour, vertu la morale kantienne dans l’éthique systématique de Hermann Cohen Feeling, Love, Virtue. Kantian Morality in Hermann Cohen’s Systematic Ethics
Autore	Didier Contadini
Editore	Vita e Pensiero
Formato	Articolo \| Pdf
Online da	07-2022
Doi	10.26350/001050_000323
Issn	0035-6247 (stampa) \| 1827-7926 (digitale)

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Descrizione
From his early writings to his later works, Kant constantly reflects on the role that feeling and love play in the domain of morality. His intention is to properly define its status for critical philosophy. Thus, moral feeling plays a prominent role in the practice of virtue. The results leave several possible interpretations open. Cohen follows Kant’s path in an original way. He thinks he can solve the problems that remain open in Kant’s philosophy through the principles of his critical idealism. He introduces the notion of affection, defining it as a cultural-historical fact and characterising it as the instrument that provides the ethical impulse with the necessary continuity. Nevertheless, Cohen fails to neutralise the destabilising effect that affect produces in the philosophical architecture he elaborates. As in Kant, this effect produces a resonant interplay between the fields of morality and aesthetics that is rich in philosophical insights. keywords Kant, Cohen, Affect, Feeling, Moral Action Biografia dell'autore Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca. Email: didier.contadini@unimib.it

Descrizione

From his early writings to his later works, Kant constantly reflects on the role that feeling and love play in the domain of morality. His intention is to properly define its status for critical philosophy. Thus, moral feeling plays a prominent role in the practice of virtue. The results leave several possible interpretations open. Cohen follows Kant’s path in an original way. He thinks he can solve the problems that remain open in Kant’s philosophy through the principles of his critical idealism. He introduces the notion of affection, defining it as a cultural-historical fact and characterising it as the instrument that provides the ethical impulse with the necessary continuity. Nevertheless, Cohen fails to neutralise the destabilising effect that affect produces in the philosophical architecture he elaborates. As in Kant, this effect produces a resonant interplay between the fields of morality and aesthetics that is rich in philosophical insights.