Sulla possibilità di un’etica senza principi

digital

Articolo

rivista	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
sezione	Online First
titolo	Sulla possibilità di un’etica senza principi On the Possibility of an Ethics without Principles
Autore	Pierpaolo Marrone
Editore	Vita e Pensiero
formato	Articolo \| Pdf
online da	02-2021
doi	10.26350/001050_000237
issn	0035-6247 (stampa) \| 1827-7926 (digitale)

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Descrizione
Most of the agents believe that acting morally entails the possibility of tracing their behavior back to norms, rules, principles. Ethical particularism in Dancy’s version represents a radical challenge to this idea. For the particularist, those who act morally do not need to appeal to principles either to motivate their action ex ante or to explain it ex post. Incidentally, Dancy seems to consider particularism also a criticism of our moral tradition that incorporates Christian ethics. In this article I make some criticisms of Dancy’s position and I argue that particularism does not provide any explanation of phenomena that are important both for morality and for social cooperation, such as trust, predictability, reliability usually attributed to moral agents. keywords Dancy, Particularism, Moral Principles, Trust, Wittgenstein Biografia dell'autore Università degli Studi di Trieste. Email: marrone@units.it

Descrizione

Most of the agents believe that acting morally entails the possibility of tracing their behavior back to norms, rules, principles. Ethical particularism in Dancy’s version represents a radical challenge to this idea. For the particularist, those who act morally do not need to appeal to principles either to motivate their action ex ante or to explain it ex post. Incidentally, Dancy seems to consider particularism also a criticism of our moral tradition that incorporates Christian ethics. In this article I make some criticisms of Dancy’s position and I argue that particularism does not provide any explanation of phenomena that are important both for morality and for social cooperation, such as trust, predictability, reliability usually attributed to moral agents.