Emergenza, Evidenza, Conseguenza logica
| RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2013 - 2
This paper aims at analyzing from a philosophical point of view the concept of logical
consequence, in order to highlight the connection between different kinds of consequence
relations and between such relations and the intuitions in virtue of which
they are introduced. The topics and theorems that are discussed are well-known.
Still, their philosophical significance for the epistemological debate is not fully
acknowledged. In what follows, the basic idea is developed according to which the
kind of intuition that allow us to justify the introduction of the second order consequence
relation is essentially different from, and emergent with respect to, the kind
of intuition that allow us to justify the introduction of the first order consequence
relation. In particular, this difference is based on the evidence of the existence of sets
that are not definable by presenting a property shared by all their elements.