Meinongian Empty Singular Terms

Name: Meinongian Empty Singular Terms
Brand: Vita e Pensiero
Price: 6.00 EUR
Availability: OnlineOnly

digital

Articolo

Rivista

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA

Fascicolo

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2021 - 4. Alexius Meinong and His Contemporaries

Titolo

Meinongian Empty Singular Terms

Autore

Alberto Voltolini

Editore

Vita e Pensiero

Formato

Articolo |

Pdf

Pagine

Online da

03-2022

Doi

10.26350/001050_000308

Issn

0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)

€ 6,00

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Descrizione

As is well known, in On Denoting Russell charged Meinong with the accusation of erroneously taking any term grammatically sounding as a singular term as a term that refers to something. In this paper, I want to show that this accusation is wrong. Definitely, for Meinong many, possibly most, singular terms that most philosophers would consider to be empty do refer to something. Yet for him, and for (Neo-)Meinongians more in general, given the principles of object determination they stuck to as relevant for how one thinks of objects, it is quite possible that there are (though relatively few) empty singular terms.

keywords

Meinong; Thesis of Universal Reference; Characterization Postulate; Principle of the Freedom of Assumption; Strenghtened and Refined Principle of the Freedom of Assumption