Incidenza della concezione del predicato d’esistenza nella critica heideggeriana dell’ontoteologia. Una rilettura di Tommaso d’Aquino e Giovanni Duns Scoto

Name: Incidenza della concezione del predicato d’esistenza nella critica heideggeriana dell’ontoteologia. Una rilettura di Tommaso d’Aquino e Giovanni Duns Scoto
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Incidenza della concezione del predicato
d’esistenza nella critica heideggeriana dell’ontoteologia. Una rilettura
di Tommaso d’Aquino e Giovanni Duns Scoto

Articolo

Rivista

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA

Fascicolo

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2015 - 1 - 2

Titolo

Incidenza della concezione del predicato d’esistenza nella critica heideggeriana dell’ontoteologia. Una rilettura di Tommaso d’Aquino e Giovanni Duns Scoto

Autore

Alessandro Ghisalberti

Editore

Vita e Pensiero

Formato

Articolo |

Pdf

Pagine

Online da

10-2015

Issn

0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)

€ 6,00

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Descrizione

Following the aim pursued by Marion to distinguish the Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of ontotheology from the scholastic metaphysics, this paper focalizes the attention on the modalities with which Thomas Aquinas sets God outside the range of the «being» that metaphysics claims to describe and define; in effect, because of the analogy, he digs a chasm between two conceptions of being: the actus essendi and the copula. The esse commune does not have a real ontological consistency, that is, it is not hypostatized: so we must not identify the esse of God with the esse as it is studied in logic and ontology. This thesis is documented through some fundamental passages of Aquinas’ works dedicated to the relation between esse commune and the Ipsum esse of God, concerning the relation between Being and Logos, and the characteristics of the actus essendi described in his metaphysics of participation. Finally, it is shown that the metaphysics of Duns Scotus is not touched by the heideggerian charge of «oblivion of being», because, on the one hand, it is founded on the univocity of the ens in quantum ens; and, on the other hand, it is based on the disjunctive transcendentals of finite or infinite: in their extension towards the gnoseological and ontological sphere, Scotus claims that just the individual entity, marked by the haecceitas, must be said existent.