Trust and Perspectivalism in the History of Epistemology: Testimony and After Certainty - Brett Yardley - Vita e Pensiero - Articolo Filosofia Neo-Scolastica Vita e Pensiero

Trust and Perspectivalism in the History of Epistemology: Testimony and After Certainty

digital Trust and Perspectivalism in the History
of Epistemology: Testimony and After Certainty
Articolo
rivista RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
fascicolo RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2020 - 1
titolo Trust and Perspectivalism in the History of Epistemology: Testimony and After Certainty
autore
editore Vita e Pensiero
formato Articolo | Pdf
online da 05-2020
doi 10.26350/001050_000171
issn 0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)
€ 6,00

Ebook in formato Pdf leggibile su questi device:

Robert Pasnau’s After Certainty tells a story about the history of epistemology from Aristotle to Hume through the establishment of epistemic ideals and their subsequent loosening when those ideals cannot be reached. Settling for less and less epistemic confidence, the epistemic quest leads fortunately not to skepticism but unfortunately to the impossibility of certainty. My aim is not to replace asnau’s story of epistemology but to highlight the presuppositions which determine his «dismal verdict» before proposing a switch in perspective. By drawing on contemporary theories of testimony, I focus on the class of philosophers who maintained two channels to knowledge – natural reason and «faith» – to argue these philosophers’ not only anticipate the limitations of natural reason but escape Pasnau’s discouraging conclusion. In shifting to these thinkers’ understanding of «faith» not as groundless belief but as trust in a speaker, the possibility of certain knowledge remains open if the speaker is divine.

keywords

Epistemology, Faith, Reason, Testimony, Trust

Biografia dell'autore

KU Leuven - Marquette University, Milwaukee. Email: brett.yardley@kuleuven.be

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