Intentionnalité des émotions et conscience affective selon Franz Brentano

Name: Intentionnalité des émotions et conscience affective selon Franz Brentano
Brand: Vita e Pensiero
Price: 6.00 EUR
Availability: OnlineOnly

digital

Articolo

Rivista

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA

Fascicolo

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2019 - 4. Franz Brentano The Origin and Originality of his Thought and School

Titolo

Intentionnalité des émotions et conscience affective selon Franz Brentano

Intentionality of Emotions and Affective Consciousness according to Franz Brentano

Autore

Bruno Langlet

Editore

Vita e Pensiero

Formato

Articolo |

Pdf

Pagine

Online da

02-2020

Doi

10.26350/001050_000143

Issn

0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)

€ 6,00

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Descrizione

One of the classical insights of Brentano’s philosophy of intentional states is that there is a close relationship between intentionality and consciousness of mental states. As a consequence, this means that the consciousness of emotions involves an immediate presentation of the presentation in which the ‘affective’ mind is directed toward some object. Somehow differently, contemporary philosophical and psychological emotion theories are more interested in the experiential criterion of emotions, and, assuming that they acknowledge the intentionality criterion, the relation between conscious phenomenality and intentionality, in this case, is conceived of as an extrinsic relation. In this article, I propose an examination of Brentano’s theory of affective states, and a short analysis of his criticisms against Hamilton’s phenomenal view of affective states, in order to show that the Brentanian approach of the connexion between intentionality and consciousness could reveal difficulties and prejudices that contemporary emotions theories have to face.