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Intentionnalité des émotions et conscience affective selon Franz Brentano

digital Intentionnalité des émotions et conscience affective
selon Franz Brentano
Articolo
rivista RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
fascicolo RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2019 - 4. Franz Brentano The Origin and Originality of his Thought and School
titolo Intentionnalité des émotions et conscience affective selon Franz Brentano
Intentionality of Emotions and Affective Consciousness according to Franz Brentano
autore
editore Vita e Pensiero
formato Articolo | Pdf
online da 02-2020
doi 10.26350/001050_000143
issn 00356247 (stampa) | 18277926 (digitale)
€ 6,00

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One of the classical insights of Brentano’s philosophy of intentional states is that there is a close relationship between intentionality and consciousness of mental states. As a consequence, this means that the consciousness of emotions involves an immediate presentation of the presentation in which the ‘affective’ mind is directed toward some object. Somehow differently, contemporary philosophical and psychological emotion theories are more interested in the experiential criterion of emotions, and, assuming that they acknowledge the intentionality criterion, the relation between conscious phenomenality and intentionality, in this case, is conceived of as an extrinsic relation. In this article, I propose an examination of Brentano’s theory of affective states, and a short analysis of his criticisms against Hamilton’s phenomenal view of affective states, in order to show that the Brentanian approach of the connexion between intentionality and consciousness could reveal difficulties and prejudices that contemporary emotions theories have to face.

keywords

Intentionality, Emotions, Mental States, Qualia, Affective Consciousness

Biografia dell'autore

Aix-Marseille Université, Aix en Provence, France. Email: bruno.langlet@univ-amu.fr