Dynamizität als realität der streit Fichte-Schelling im licht der auseinandersetzung über das ontologische prinzip der transzendentalen subjektivität
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This article introduces a central conception of reality in German Idealism. According to this conception, the highest form of reality resides in the dynamically self-expressing being of transcendental subjectivity, which precedes the self-knowledge of subjectivity. The early works of Fichte and Schelling are discussed in the context of a debate about the feasibility of this conception. Fichte’s Foundation of the Science of Knowledge in 1794/95 is considered the seminal discovery of this conception, while Schelling, in 1800/01, criticizes Fichte for not fully grasping its unique conceptual logic. I analyze this relationship between Schelling and Fichte in two aspects. Firstly, Schelling identifies a fundamental deficiency in Fichte’s conception, which relies solely on the presence of actual consciousness to define the reality of transcendental subjectivity. Secondly, Schelling provides a new foundation for this conception, viewing it through the lens of a pre-conscious dynamic, where the genesis of actual consciousness becomes possible.
keywordsFichte, Schelling, Reality, Subjectivity, The Dynamically Self-expressing BeingBiografia dell'autoreBergische Universität Wuppertal. Email: zhouchb0@gmail.com |
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