Womit soll der Anfang der Philosophie gemacht werden? Fichtes Konzeption der genetischen Evidenz als Anfangskonzept der Philosophie
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This paper elucidates Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s conception of the beginning of philosophy as articulated in his Wissenschaftslehre of 1804/II. It argues that a legitimate beginning of philosophy must emerge from a reflection on the operative discontinuity inherent in conceptualization itself. Fichte observes that our conceptual-linguistic framework – at its operative level – continuously generates a disjunction between the act of speaking and the spoken content. From this insight, he formulates a central philosophical question: how can the unity of reason, which precedes and grounds all such disjunctions, present itself to the subject in a legitimate manner without entailing performative self-contradiction? I contend that Fichte introduces the notion of genetic evidence to ground this unity of reason. Rather than conceiving unity as a static pole or principle, Fichte reconceives it as a dynamic genetic field in which reason
comes to experiential self-manifestation. This field is characterized by three interrelated features: (1) transcendental geneticity, (2) experiential transcendentality, and (3) a self-legitimating dynamic. The unveiling of this genetic field constitutes the true point of departure for the Wissenschaftslehre as a self-legitimizing science. keywordsJohann Gottlieb Fichte, Beginning of Philosophy, Unity of Reason, Genetic Evidence, ConceptBiografia dell'autoreBergische Universität Wuppertal. Email: zhouchb0@gmail.com |
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