The Passions of the Self. From Descartes to Hume through Spinoza

digital

Articolo

Rivista

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA

Fascicolo

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2020 - 2. Ethica e Passions de l’âme Spinoza con e contro Descartes

Titolo

The Passions of the Self. From Descartes to Hume through Spinoza

Autore

Emanuela Scribano

Editore

Vita e Pensiero

Formato

Articolo |

Pdf

Online da

07-2020

Doi

10.26350/001050_000191

Issn

0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)

€ 6,00

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Descrizione

Contrary to what happens in Descartes’s philosophy, self-knowledge is problematic in Spinoza. The knowledge of one’s mind, in fact, is only that involved in the perception of the affections of one’s body. This thesis makes difficult to develop a satisfactory theory of pride which, according to Spinoza, implies a knowledge of the self as the cause of the joy caused in others. This difficulty was absent in the philosophy of Descartes. This difficulty is presented in the same terms in the philosophy of David Hume, and emerges in the discussion of the passion of pride. Both authors are united by the refusal of the Cartesian thesis of privileged access to the nature of their mind.