Per una psicologia della storia. Brentano, lettore di Comte, e la teoria delle quattro fasi della filosofia

Name: Per una psicologia della storia. Brentano, lettore di Comte, e la teoria delle quattro fasi della filosofia
Brand: Vita e Pensiero
Price: 6.00 EUR
Availability: OnlineOnly

digital

Articolo

Rivista

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA

Fascicolo

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2019 - 4. Franz Brentano The Origin and Originality of his Thought and School

Titolo

Per una psicologia della storia. Brentano, lettore di Comte, e la teoria delle quattro fasi della filosofia

For a Psychology of History. Brentano, Reader of Comte, and the Four Phases of Philosophy’s Theory

Autore

Emanuele Mariani

Editore

Vita e Pensiero

Formato

Articolo |

Pdf

Pagine

Online da

02-2020

Doi

10.26350/001050_000152

Issn

0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)

€ 6,00

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Descrizione

«The four phases of philosophy and its current state» has been generally considered as one of the most original theories of Franz Brentano and, concomitantly, as one of the most deeply rooted in the spirit of the time. It is well-known that in this respect Brentano owes a debt to Auguste Comte’s leading idea of a scientific development that allows a general reassessment of the history of philosophy, although Brentano’s view opts for scheme of repeated cycles through a movement of ascending and declining phases. By complementing the historiographical approaches that have been largely developed by recent literature (D. Fisette, D. Münch, R. Schmit), we would like to sketch a theoretical reconsideration of the Brentanian «four phases of philosophy». A theoretical reconsideration that interprets Brentano’s theory from a psychological standpoint as an alternative to other dominant interpretations (Mayer-Hillebrand, Mezei and Smith): the declining phases of philosophy should thus, more precisely, be understood as the improper representations of what philosophy, psychologically grounded, properly is.