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Il problema del movimento in Aristotele e Spinoza. Una questione di principio

digital Il problema del movimento in Aristotele e Spinoza. Una questione di principio
Articolo
rivista RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
fascicolo RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2015 - 4
titolo Il problema del movimento in Aristotele e Spinoza. Una questione di principio
autore
editore Vita e Pensiero
formato Articolo | Pdf
online da 03-2016
issn 00356247 (stampa) | 18277926 (digitale)
€ 6,00

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In this paper the author aims to underline some common elements in Aristotelian and Spinozian philosophies, which, although in different contexts and words, show a substantial affinity, both in the approach to some questions and in the problematic outcome on these issues. Specifically, the author focuses on the conception of nature and on the relationship between nature and movement in the two philosophical systems and shows that both Aristotle and Spinoza, in order to determine the movement and to allow the passage from what moves and what is moved, necessarily presuppose a principle of activity, internal to the nature. On this principle, coeternal to nature, both the systems are not adequately focused: in Aristotelian philosophy, it is ‘hidden’ behind the difficulty expressing it in explaining the motion and the process of causation; in the Spinozian one, it is implicitly affirmed in the conception of motus as immediate infinitive mode. Hence the same difficulty in proving of the origin of the movement.