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I Sentimenti morali in Descartes e Spinoza Il caso di pietà e invidia, favore e indignazione

novitàdigital I Sentimenti morali in Descartes e Spinoza Il caso di pietà e invidia, favore e indignazione
Articolo
rivista RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
sezione Online First
titolo I Sentimenti morali in Descartes e Spinoza Il caso di pietà e invidia, favore e indignazione
Moral Feelings in Descartes and Spinoza. The Case of Pity and Envy, Favor and Indignation
autore
editore Vita e Pensiero
formato Articolo | Pdf
online da 03-2020
doi 10.26350/001050_000164
issn 00356247 (stampa) | 18277926 (digitale)
€ 6,00

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The article compares Descartes’ and Spinoza’s theory of passions through an analysis of their treatment of pity or commiseration, envy, favor and indignation. By analyzing these affects, the article seeks to accomplish two objectives. on the one hand, it aims to show that complexities of the relationship between Spinoza’s Ethica and Descartes’s Passions de l’ame are ignored if the latter is considered simply as a polemical target of the former. on the other hand, it aims to clarify how Spinoza, starting from anthropological premises opposed to Descartes’, can present a model of a strong or generous man that has many elements in common Descartes’.

keywords

Descartes, Spinoza, passions, morality

Biografia dell'autore

Università degli Studi “Roma tre”. email: francesco.toto@uniroma3.it