The Boundaries of our Inner Life. Meinong and Scheler on Representation, Feeling and Value

novitàdigital The Boundaries of our Inner Life.
Meinong and Scheler on Representation, Feeling and Value

Articolo

rivista	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
fascicolo	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2021 - 4. Alexius Meinong and His Contemporaries
titolo	The Boundaries of our Inner Life. Meinong and Scheler on Representation, Feeling and Value
Autore	Gemmo Iocco
Editore	Vita e Pensiero
formato	Articolo \| Pdf
online da	03-2022
doi	10.26350/001050_000302
issn	0035-6247 (stampa) \| 1827-7926 (digitale)

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Descrizione
The aim of this paper is to discuss the resemblance, remarked by Max Scheler, between his value-theory and that developed by Alexius Meinong in order to shed light on those theoretical aspects of their value-theories that effectively legitimize Scheler’s assessment that Meinong’s research on value is compatible with his own. After having briefly showed (section 1) in what representationalism consists, I move (section 2) to outline Meinong’s account of presentation in order to stress out the cognitive function of feeling and its role in value-experience. In the third section I turn to briefly sketch out Scheler’s account of feeling in light of his criticism toward Brentano’s thesis according to which only inner perception is endowed with evidence. I argue that the resemblance between Scheler’s and Meinong’s theories of value can be found in their attempt to overcome representationalism both by pointing out the intertwinement between feeling and value and highlighting the immediate nature of emotional experience. keywords Meinong, Scheler, Presentation, Representation, Value-Theory Biografia dell'autore Università degli Studi di Parma. Email: gemmo.iocco@unipr.it

Descrizione

The aim of this paper is to discuss the resemblance, remarked by Max Scheler, between his value-theory and that developed by Alexius Meinong in order to shed light on those theoretical aspects of their value-theories that effectively legitimize Scheler’s assessment that Meinong’s research on value is compatible with his own. After having briefly showed (section 1) in what representationalism consists, I move (section 2) to outline Meinong’s account of presentation in order to stress out the cognitive function of feeling and its role in value-experience. In the third section I turn to briefly sketch out Scheler’s account of feeling in light of his criticism toward Brentano’s thesis according to which only inner perception is endowed with evidence. I argue that the resemblance between Scheler’s and Meinong’s theories of value can be found in their attempt to overcome representationalism both by pointing out the intertwinement between feeling and value and highlighting the immediate nature of emotional experience.