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Can Aristotle’s prime mover be a physical cause?

digital Can Aristotle’s prime mover be a physical cause?
Articolo
rivista RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
fascicolo RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2015 - 4
titolo Can Aristotle’s prime mover be a physical cause?
autore
editore Vita e Pensiero
formato Articolo | Pdf
online da 03-2016
issn 00356247 (stampa) | 18277926 (digitale)
€ 6,00

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The paper examines Aristotle’s arguments for an unmoved mover in his Physics and Metaphysics. First, the question is raised whether it is legitimate to address this theological topic within the context of a scientific investigation of nature at all. The question presupposes, however, that physics can do without at least a theological perspective, and Aristotle argues that it cannot. In a second step, Aristotle’s arguments for an unmoved mover are reconstructed. One important result is that Aristotle cannot explain the nature of the first mover and the type of transcendent causality that is involved in a physical context because these questions are genuinely metaphysical. Therefore, the third step leads to Metaphysics Λ where both questions are answered. The paper closes with three points for further discussion: (1) Is Aristotle’s metaphysical conception of matter really sufficient? (2) Does his metaphysical theology rest on an entirely outdated physics? (3) What is the method that Aristotle employs in theological reasoning, and especially, how do his inferences towards the existence of a divine intellect work?