Two Versions of the Emotional Intentionality Thesis. A Contemporary Look at Meinong and Scheler

novitàdigital Two Versions of the Emotional Intentionality
Thesis. A Contemporary Look at Meinong and Scheler

Articolo

rivista	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
fascicolo	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2021 - 4. Alexius Meinong and His Contemporaries
titolo	Two Versions of the Emotional Intentionality Thesis. A Contemporary Look at Meinong and Scheler
Autore	Íngrid Vendrell Ferran
Editore	Vita e Pensiero
formato	Articolo \| Pdf
online da	03-2022
doi	10.26350/001050_000307
issn	0035-6247 (stampa) \| 1827-7926 (digitale)

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Descrizione
According to «the emotional intentionality thesis», emotional experiences exhibit a sui generis intentional structure which consists in presenting the values of the objects they target. This paper examines the versions of this thesis put forward by Meinong and Scheler. While Meinong’s «emotional presentation account» maintains that emotions present values, Scheler’s «value-ception account» carefully distinguishes between the apprehension of value in a feeling and the emotional response. The comparative study of both accounts is articulated around two issues central to contemporary emotion research: 1) the «epistemic question» that examines which emotional experience is in fact responsible for the apprehension of value; and 2) the «cognitive bases question» which explores the relation between emotional experiences and the cognitive states responsible for presenting the objects targeted by the emotions. After introducing the emotional intentionality thesis and its historical roots in Brentano (section 1), the next two sections examine in turn the versions of this thesis provided by Meinong and Scheler (sections 2 and 3). The paper concludes by summarizing the results of the comparative study and extracting some teachings for current research (section 4). keywords Intentionality; Value; Emotion; Feeling; Meinong; Scheler, Value-feeling; Value-ception Biografia dell'autore Goethe-Universität Frankfurt. Email: VendrellFerran@em.uni-frankfurt.de

Descrizione

According to «the emotional intentionality thesis», emotional experiences exhibit a sui generis intentional structure which consists in presenting the values of the objects they target. This paper examines the versions of this thesis put forward by Meinong and Scheler. While Meinong’s «emotional presentation account» maintains that emotions present values, Scheler’s «value-ception account» carefully distinguishes between the apprehension of value in a feeling and the emotional response. The comparative study of both accounts is articulated around two issues central to contemporary emotion research: 1) the «epistemic question» that examines which emotional experience is in fact responsible for the apprehension of value; and 2) the «cognitive bases question» which explores the relation between emotional experiences and the cognitive states responsible for presenting the objects targeted by the emotions. After introducing the emotional intentionality thesis and its historical roots in Brentano (section 1), the next two sections examine in turn the versions of this thesis provided by Meinong and Scheler (sections 2 and 3). The paper concludes by summarizing the results of the comparative study and extracting some teachings for current research (section 4).