Quando lo scetticismo globale non ha senso

Name: Quando lo scetticismo globale non ha senso
Brand: Vita e Pensiero
Price: 6.00 EUR
Availability: OnlineOnly

digital

Articolo

Rivista

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA

Fascicolo

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2015 - 3

Titolo

Quando lo scetticismo globale non ha senso

Autore

Nicla Vassallo

Editore

Vita e Pensiero

Formato

Articolo |

Pdf

Pagine

Online da

12-2015

Issn

0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)

€ 6,00

Ebook in formato Pdf leggibile su questi device:

Computer
con Software:
- Adobe PDF Reader
Android
iPhone/Ipad
con App:
- Adobe PDF Reader
E-Book Reader
Ibs Tolino
Kobo

Descrizione

After a brief initial analysis of global skepticism, which includes a concise discussion of the Descartes’s, Moore’s, and Wittgenstein’s views, this article examines the conditions of the tripartite analysis of knowledge with the aim of understanding whether there is a condition that any cognitive subject does not satisfy within a skeptical hypotheses. The author focuses in particular on the justification and truth conditions and reaches a first conclusion: in contrast to what many claim, i.e., that the truth condition is not satisfied, even in a skeptical situation, the subject satisfied all three conditions of the analysis; therefore, we cannot assert that the subject does not know (almost) anything of what she believes to be knowing and global skepticism makes no sense. In the effort to provide a sense for global skepticism, the author examines the main conditions that have been proposed in order to enrich the tripartite analysis in order to resolve the Gettier problem, in the pursuit of valid conditions that are nonetheless not satisfied by a subject in a skeptical hypothesis. This pursuit leads to no positive result which warrants the conclusion that global skepticism loses any sense.