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La percezione sensibile nella Psicologia dal punto di vista empirico di Brentano

digital La percezione sensibile nella
Psicologia dal punto di vista empirico di Brentano
Articolo
rivista RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
fascicolo RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2019 - 4. Franz Brentano The Origin and Originality of his Thought and School
titolo La percezione sensibile nella Psicologia dal punto di vista empirico di Brentano
The Sense Perception in Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
autore
editore Vita e Pensiero
formato Articolo | Pdf
online da 02-2020
doi 10.26350/001050_000149
issn 00356247 (stampa) | 18277926 (digitale)
€ 6,00

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In his 1874 Psychology, Brentano proceeds to a revision of Fechner’s psychophysics. Though Fechner’s formula must be simplified, Brentano’s criticism is not destructive. In fact, like any other mental activity, sensations do admit of a measurable intensity. Later Brentano took back this whole stance and developed a new doctrine of sensory perception. Accordingly, intensity must be completely reduced to spatiality and thus pertains exclusively to sensory appearances. As a consequence, despite Brentano’s understatement in his 1911 book on the classification of mental activities, a wide portion of his 1874 Psychology becomes untenable for him. Brentano’s new doctrine of sensory perception was unsuccessful, and failed to convince even his closest pupils. The best explanation for its adoption is that Brentano considered it compatible with the physiology of Hermann Helmholtz and the law of specific energy.

keywords

Perception, Intensity, Brentano, Fechner, Helmholtz

Biografia dell'autore

Università degli Studi di Trieste. Email: martinel@units.it