Distinzione reale e unione sostanziale. Lo statuto del soggetto in Cartesio

digital

Articolo

Rivista

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA

Fascicolo

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2020 - 2. Ethica e Passions de l’âme Spinoza con e contro Descartes

Titolo

Distinzione reale e unione sostanziale. Lo statuto del soggetto in Cartesio

Real Distinction and Substantial Union. The Statute of the Subject in Descartes

Autore

Roberto Morani

Editore

Vita e Pensiero

Formato

Articolo |

Pdf

Online da

07-2020

Doi

10.26350/001050_000188

Issn

0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)

€ 6,00

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Descrizione

The essay aims to examine the status of the subject in Descartes from viewpoint of the problem of the coexistence of the doctrines of the union and distinction of body and soul. After a brief reconstruction of the interpretative tendencies that prevailed in Cartesian literature, the essay analyses the positions of Descartes after the release of the Meditationes de prima Philosophia, both in the Responses to the Objections of Gassendi and Arnauld, and in the letters to Regius and to Princess Elisabeth. The analysis of two paragraphs of Principia Philosophiae confirms that Descartes, in the final phase of his philosophical production, conceived the subject as originally immersed in an opaque and obscure psychic dimension, from which he never definitively frees himself. The conclusions show that the Cartesian thought is a crossroads of different paths, including that of decentralized subjectivity and open to otherness.