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Distinzione reale e unione sostanziale. Lo statuto del soggetto in Cartesio

digital Distinzione reale e unione sostanziale.
Lo statuto del soggetto in Cartesio
Articolo
rivista RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
fascicolo RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2020 - 2. Ethica e Passions de l’âme Spinoza con e contro Descartes
titolo Distinzione reale e unione sostanziale. Lo statuto del soggetto in Cartesio
Real Distinction and Substantial Union. The Statute of the Subject in Descartes
autore
editore Vita e Pensiero
formato Articolo | Pdf
online da 07-2020
doi 10.26350/001050_000188
issn 00356247 (stampa) | 18277926 (digitale)
€ 6,00

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The essay aims to examine the status of the subject in Descartes from viewpoint of the problem of the coexistence of the doctrines of the union and distinction of body and soul. After a brief reconstruction of the interpretative tendencies that prevailed in Cartesian literature, the essay analyses the positions of Descartes after the release of the Meditationes de prima Philosophia, both in the Responses to the Objections of Gassendi and Arnauld, and in the letters to Regius and to Princess Elisabeth. The analysis of two paragraphs of Principia Philosophiae confirms that Descartes, in the final phase of his philosophical production, conceived the subject as originally immersed in an opaque and obscure psychic dimension, from which he never definitively frees himself. The conclusions show that the Cartesian thought is a crossroads of different paths, including that of decentralized subjectivity and open to otherness.

keywords

Descartes, Subject, Body, Soul

Biografia dell'autore

Università degli Studi di Firenze. Email: roberto.morani@unifi.it