Scepticism and Contextualism. Three Objections and Three Replies

Name: Scepticism and Contextualism. Three Objections and Three Replies
Brand: Vita e Pensiero
Price: 6.00 EUR
Availability: OnlineOnly

digital

Articolo

Rivista

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA

Fascicolo

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2017 - 4. Il pensiero filosofico e teologico in Bonaventura da Bagnoregio

Titolo

Scepticism and Contextualism. Three Objections and Three Replies

Autori

Stefano Leardi, Nicla Vassallo

Editore

Vita e Pensiero

Formato

Articolo |

Pdf

Pagine

Online da

03-2018

Doi

http://filosofianeoscolastica.vitaepensiero.com/doi/10.26350/001050_000034

Issn

0035-6247 (stampa) | 1827-7926 (digitale)

€ 6,00

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Descrizione

The contextualist anti-sceptical argument seems to be more compelling than many other anti-sceptical strategies, as the refusal of the closure principle preached by Dretske and Nozick or Moore’s common-sensical approach. Yet, it has been maintained that a better response to the sceptic can be expressed by following a neo-moorean approach. Here we defend the contextualist argument from three objections moved by Pritchard, a leading advocate of neo-mooreanism. The first objection claims that contextualism would be a «revisionist» linguistic thesis; the second that the contextualist argument «concessive» nature would lead to a sceptical conclusion; the third that the contextualist thesis that ‘know(s)’ is a context-sensitive term would be unnecessary since what the contextualist takes as a change in the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions might be better explained as a change in the assertability-conditions of those sentences. In the end, we will maintain that the three objections are ineffective.